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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant UTCO Associates, Ltd. ("UTCO") appeals a
final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, entered on a jury
verdict in favor of Appellees Sumerset Houseboats Div. SMI
("Sumerset") and its President, James E. Sharpe ("Mr. Sharpe").1
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1997), this Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal as it was poured over by the Utah
Supreme Court.

[R1798]2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this
appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err in declining to instruct

the jury on UTCO's equitable promissory estoppel claim despite
uncontroverted evidence establishing that:
a)

UTCO failed to exhaust its claim in bankruptcy
against Mr. Zimmerman?

b)

UTCO had a valid, enforceable contract with Mr.
Zimmerman for repayment of the funds sought from
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe?

1

UTCO's claims against defendant K. Demarr Zimmerman
("Mr. Zimmerman") were stayed as a result of Mr. Zimmerman's
bankruptcy and, therefore, they were not submitted to the jury.
2

All citations are to the record as indexed by the Clerk
of the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to Rule 11(b) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1

c)

UTCO had agreed to loan and had loaned the funds
to Mr. Zimmerman prior to the alleged promise by
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe?

d)

UTCO admitted that the money transferred to
Sumerset was Mr. Zimmerman's money, not that of
UTCO?

The standard of appellate review for a trial court's refusal to
give a proposed jury instruction is a guestion of law for which
no deference is given to the trial court.
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995);

E.g., Cornia v.
State v. Robertson, 923

P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997)(citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d
232, 238 (Utah 1992)).
2.

Did the trial court err in excluding evidence that

the serial number tentatively reserved for the Zimmerman
houseboat was, three months after the alleged fraud and after ,
Zimmerman had canceled the purchase, assigned to another boat
being manufactured for sale to an unrelated third-party?
The standard of appellate review for a trial court's evidentiary
ruling is an abuse of discretion and the trial court's ruling is
given deference in light of its advantageous position. E.g. , Nay
v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993)("abuse
of discretion and reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds
of reasonability"); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838
(Utah 1992)("court's rulings regarding admissibility will not be
overturned 'unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in
error 1 ");

State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993).
2

3.

If the trial court erred in issuing a ruling

precluding the introduction of evidence describing the houseboat
to which the serial number was eventually assigned more than
three months after the alleged fraudulent representation, was
UTCO prejudiced as it introduced evidence: (1)

That, at the time

of the alleged fraudulent statement, there was no houseboat in
existence with the serial number as set forth in the invoice
between Sumerset and Mr. Zimmerman;

(2)

That no houseboat with

that serial number was ever built to the specifications in the
invoice between Sumerset and Mr. Zimmerman; and (3)

That a

houseboat bearing the serial number initially intended for the
Zimmerman houseboat was sold to another party?
The standard of appellate review of a trial court's evidentiary
rulings is whether there is a "reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings."

E.g., State v.

Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67-70 (Utah 1993)(improper evidence ruling
reversed only if showing of prejudice (i.e., "reasonable
likelihood that the error affected outcome of the proceedings"));
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). 3

3

UTCO f s statement of the issues also sets forth,
apparently inadvertently, an issue pertaining to an instruction
given by the trial court pertaining to fraudulent intent. See
UTCO's Brief of Appellant, Statement of Issues, no. 3 at pp. 3-4.
UTCO failed to brief the issue, however, so it is not properly
preserved for appeal and cannot be ruled upon by the Court. E.g.,
Utah R. App. P. 24; State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1989); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App.
1995); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992);
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 710-711 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe
do not address that issue.
3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following cases are determinative of the issues
pertaining to the trial courtfs refusal to instruct the jury on
UTCO's promissory estoppel claims: Knight v. Post,4 748 P.2d
1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 1988)(pending bankruptcy claims
against third-party barred equitable claims because of failure to
exhaust all available legal remedies);

Commercial Fixtures and

Furnishing v. Adams,5 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977)(existence of
valid contract with third-party to recover debt bars equitable
claim seeking to imply contract against another)•
The following Utah Rules of Evidence are determinative
of the issues pertaining to the trial court's refusal to allow
evidence pertaining to the reassignment of the serial number:
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible;
irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States of the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Attached as Addendum "A".
Attached as Addendum "B".
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
UTCO brought this action against Sumerset and Sharpe
asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
quantum meruit, contract implied in law, breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, foreclosure
of security interest, misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, conspiracy, conversion, implied in fact
contract, prejudgment interest, and punitive damages• [R561-577]
These same claims were asserted against Mr. Zimmerman who
subsequently filed bankruptcy and the action was stayed as to
him.

[R108-109]
On July 11, 1996, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed a

Motion in Limine which sought the exclusion of evidence:
(1) that the serial number tentatively reserved for Mr.
Zimmerman's houseboat was eventually assigned to another
houseboat more than three months after the alleged
misrepresentations and after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the order and
directed Sumerset to apply his $58,384 to Mr. Zimmerman's then
existing debt owed to Sumerset, and (2) that the second houseboat
was eventually sold to a third-party.

[1486-1490]

The grounds

for this Motion were that these subsequent events were irrelevant
to UTCOfs claims and, moreover, under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, any probative value would be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the
5

issues, and would unnecessarily lengthen the trial.
July 22, 1996, UTCO filed a Memorandum in Opposition.
1752]

[Id.] On
[R1744-

On July 22, 1996, the Court granted the Motion and stated:
I'm going to grant the motion. I can't see any
relevance to the proposition that the, at least based
on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a
serial number to another boat, to a third person who is
not claiming to be involved in this situation, has any
relevance to the state of mind of the Defendant for
purposes of committing fraud at the time these
representations were made. I recognize after events
may have some probative value, but in this case I can't
see what it might be.
The fact that the boat with a serial number did
not exist, and was never built to the specifications in
the original invoice, is all the Plaintiff needs in
that regard. The rest of it is surplusage and a waste
of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not coming
in. The Motion is granted.
That doesn't mean you can't put in evidence that
there was never a boat with that serial number, or that
was the serial number on the invoices and there is no
such boat, but it's not, I don't see any relevance to
the fact that serial number now appears on some other
boat. The Motion is granted.

[R1910]6
b

On July 22, 1996, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed two
additional motions in limine: (1) seeking to exclude any
reference or mention of any complaint or investigation by any
government agency, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which Plaintiff had initiated; and (2) seeking to exclude the
testimony of two of Plaintiff's belatedly designated witnesses,
Ellery Summer (Motor Vehicles Employee) and Ken Crooks (F.B.I.).
[R1541-1547, 1560-1564] In chambers prior to trial, UTCO's
counsel stated that they did not intend to introduce the evidence
or call the witnesses these motions sought to exclude.
Accordingly, these motions in limine became moot and, contrary to
the representation in UTCO's Brief, were not granted by the trial
court, or even decided. UTCO did not attempt to call the
witnesses or introduce the evidence. Given that these motions
were not ruled upon and the evidence was not offered at trial,
and given that UTCO's Brief fails to address the merits of these
motions, they are not properly before this Court on this appeal.
See, e.g., State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
6
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nondischargeability; [R1580-1582] and

(2)

UTCO's promissory

estoppel claim is barred as there was no reasonable reliance as
UTCO had already loaned Mr. Zimmerman the $58,384 prior to any
alleged promise and UTCO admitted it had no ownership interest in
that money.

[R1573-1575, 1582]

The issues raised by Defendants'

Motion for Directed Verdict were extensively and fully argued by
all parties.

[R2390-2416] .

While the trial court initially indicated that it was
denying the Motion for Directed Verdict, [R2416] the trial court,
based in part on the position asserted in the Motion for Directed
Verdict, subsequently refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's
promissory estoppel claim and stated:
I've indicated in chambers that I was not
instructing on the equitable causes [sic] of action of
promissory [sic] estoppel. For the record, the reasons
I have determined not to do that is, I am satisfied the
Plaintiffs [sic] have an adequate remedy at law and, I
believe, it is the rule that equitable remedy is not
available as long as there is an adequate remedy at
law. And I believe there is here.
Also, I am satisfied that the concept promissory
estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that
are being asserted in this case by the Plaintiff. And
they'll just be surplusage.
Finally, I'm satisfied that the Court of Appeals
case that was cited to me by Plaintiff's counsel,
saying that they seem to suggest that the Court must
send equitable causes of action to the jury, is
factually distinguishable in this case and I'm
satisfied that it would be inappropriate to submit that
equitable claim to a jury, if it was otherwise proper.
[R2606-2607]
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed
on UTCO's claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, punitive
8

f
' - /''-l*,'1.]

S u m e r s e t a n d M ; . Si ; r p* • i .-. ) ."laim.;.

. i L

tJ

.

w.i/aeLSet (ii.j rli . S u a : p*

"

.'

Pursuant -o

•-.

This appeal ensued. .•' ••

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Sumerset i s a Kentucky corpoxati on engaged :i n the
<.•

-

:ujfcuringand selling houseboats, [R1958] and has

been "n •_: ^r . usiness since 1953.
CIJLX

jLeleva lr '
i .i

[R1972]

Mr, Sharpe was, at

t: 1 1 e Pres:i dent oI: Si iiiierse 1:
: .

act,. •: w a s s t a y e i <•

.
i

I<-J':*.!-

|||

- i ^ u i i. liii-.it;tiikin, a g a i n s t w h o n thrr:
- * •"•*; b a n k r u p t r*y

v

i ii-u

T

-a c "

[.Li^iids-: i. M s e b c a t s a n d line; .u . ] wt : ^k : y s h a r e s

Mi*- h o a r t o

i n d : v i d u a : •:. r *

^ ] ' r •• - V - 6 D &

j

* ir^-rhar^ ar^on'T *nr^^+-

•\tj')iv:a/ Georgia ar. : then visited Sumerset 1 ^ manufacturing riant
in Somerset, Kentucky.

["'

months Zimiuerman purchase-., L , ;v i.uusobOiL-

: v..iu .>:.«.v. is^t

lc*-.: ''

On approximate-1 y Novembei
company, Lake Po

"

-

the purchase ot ,

^u< . y- ij. iVaiseboa;

R2126]

Vweiinar, a

*
'

W

\

connection with this proposed transaction, Sumerset created an
After t:*i • transaction Sumerset sold four houseboats to
Mr. Zimmerman and related entities, [R2126] These transactions
are not at Issu^ i : "a : s litigati on.
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invoice describing the specifications and amenities of the
houseboat to be custom built and indicating the purchasers as
"Lake Powell-N-Houseboats/Demarr [Zimmerman]."

[R2048]

It was

anticipated that manufacture of the boat would be completed in
March, 1993, [R2079]
$120,000.00.

and the purchase price would be

[R2051]

To finance this purchase, Mr. Zimmerman contacted UTCO,
a lending source he had previously used, seeking $75,000 to be
paid toward the purchase price.

[R2178-2179]

UTCO refused to

make a $75,000 loan to Mr. Zimmerman, but did agree to a loan in
the amount of $60,000.

[R2178-2179]

In connection with UTCO's

loan to Mr. Zimmerman, as was the case with their prior loans,
Mr. Nelson, UTCO's counsel, prepared a promissory note, security
agreement, acknowledgement and UCC-1 Financing Statement, which
were executed by Mr. Zimmerman on December 21, 1992.
2181, 2195, 2292, 2582-2583]

[R2179-

Sumerset was not a party to these

agreements nor were these documents provided to Sumerset.
[R2540-2541]
Neither Sumerset nor Mr. Sharpe had any business
dealing directly with UTCO.

In fact, Mr. Sharpe testified that

he did not know UTCO was lending money to Mr. Zimmerman and, for
all Mr. Sharpe knew, Mr. Nelson was Mr. Zimmerman's lawyer.
[R2538-2541]
After the loan was made, Mr. Nelson purports to have
had two conversations with Mr. Sharpe which serve as the sole
basis for, inter alia, UTCOfs promissory estoppel claim.
10
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1\

I believe that I di d, y e s .

Q.
A.J ] right. And going on i n y o u r deposition,
guestion, line 20, page 3 9 . "Just so I understand the
timing of this conversation, did t h i s occur before or
after UTCO had made the d e c i s i o n to actually loan funds
to Mr
Zi mmerman?
"Answei: :

I t. was after.

"Qi i Eistion: Did this conversation occur before or after
the conversation you had w i t h M r . Zimmerman in which
y o u informed him that UTCO would, in fact, loan him
$60,000.00?
The answer was after. Do yen i recal 1 giving those
answers to those questions during y o u r deposit! on?
A
I don , t recall the specific questions or answers
but I have read them, and the answers are correct.
Q.
And that is consistent with y o u r testimony here at
trial , ri ght?
A

^

rpj ia t i s correct.

11

[R2241-2242] (emphases added) 1 0
On December 29, 1992, Sumerset received a wire transfer
in the amount of $58,384.

[R2129]

That wire transfer indicated

it was to be applied to "Demarr Zimmerman Account", without
mention of any particular boat.

[R2129-2130, 2272]

These funds

belonged to Mr. Zimmerman and, based on its own admissions, UTCO
had no interest in these funds wired to Sumerset.11

[R2552-

2553]
Mr. Zimmerman began making payments to UTCO as required
under the promissory note, [R2201] however, he failed to pay the
balance of the loan when it came due in July, 1993.

[R2206]

UTCO instituted this action against Mr. Zimmerman to recover
payment under the promissory note upon which Mr. Zimmerman had
defaulted.

[R2314]

In October of 1993, after this action was

filed, Mr. Zimmerman filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and UTCO filed
claims against Mr. Zimmerman in that bankruptcy to recover the
Mr. Nelson was the only individual associated with UTCO
that had any discussions with Sumerset or Mr. Sharpe prior to the
initiation of this litigation. More particularly, Mr. Kent,
UTCO's sole general partner, expressly testified that he had no
contact, conversations or communications with Mr. Sharpe at any
time prior to this action. [R2363]
11

With respect to the request for admission, the trial
court stated to the jury as follows:
All right. The request is as follows. The Defendant,
Sumerset, sent to the Plaintiff the following request
and it reads as follows.
"Admit that you did not wire any funds to Sumerset
that belonged to Plaintiff." Plaintiff is, of course,
UTCO. The answer is, says, "See general objection."
You don't need to worry about that, "but admitted,"
that it was admitted.
[R2552-2553]
12
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court Properly Refused To Instruct The Jury
On UTCO's Equitable Promissory Estoppel Claim.
The trial court correctly held UTCO had an adequate
remedy at law and declined to instruct the jury on UTCO's
equitable claim of promissory estoppel.

The only evidence at

trial was that UTCO loaned the $58,384 to Mr. Zimmerman under an
express contract to which neither Sumerset nor Mr. Sharpe were
parties.

The uncontroverted evidence also showed that UTCO had

filed claims against Mr. Zimmerman which were pending in the
bankruptcy court seeking to collect those very funds, and those
collection efforts were put on hold while UTCO pursued this
equitable claim against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.

Under this

Court's holding in Knight v. Post, 748 P. 2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah
App. 1988) this attempted end-run around available legal remedies
cannot be allowed and the trial court properly dismissed the
equitable promissory estoppel claim.

See also Commercial

Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1997)(existence of valid contract with third-party to recover
debt bars equitable claim seeking to imply contract against
another).
The trial court's refusal to instruct on the promissory
estoppel claim was also proper on the independent bases that the
evidence conclusively established that UTCO did not reasonably
rely on the alleged promise as:

(1)

UTCO had already agreed to

loan and had loaned the funds to Mr. Zimmerman before the promise
was purportedly made by Mr. Sharpe;
14

and (2) The funds wired to

S u m e r s e t b e l o n g e d --.•.-]•...••*.. |y t o M r . Z i m m e r m a n a n d U T C O had n o
ow ner shi p i

•

The Trial Court Properly Precluded Admission Of
Evidence Regarding The Assignment Of The Tentatively
Reserved Serial Number To A Different Boat Three Months
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vast amounts of evidence concerning the propriety of maintaining
serial numbers in a sequential order and focusing on things that
occurred three months after the transaction giving rise to UTCO's
claims.

Additionally, the jury would have been confused

regarding the effect of the evidence and, assuming a violation
occurred, very probably would have rendered a verdict on that
fact instead of focusing on the relevant conduct which occurred
at the time of the transaction between the parties themselves.
Rule 403 is designed precisely to prevent this type of
distraction and confusion during a trial and the trial court was
clearly within its discretion in precluding this evidence.

ARGUMENT.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM.
The trial court, at the conclusion of the evidence and

after receiving and hearing argument from all parties on
Sumerset's and Mr. Sharpe's Motion for Directed Verdict on the
promissory estoppel claim, refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's
promissory estoppel claim.

A primary basis for declining to

instruct the jury on this claim (i.e., that UTCO had an adequate
remedy at law which barred its promissory estoppel claim) mirrors
the chief basis upon which the Motion for Directed Verdict on the
promissory estoppel claim was made by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.
While the trial court did not expressly reference the immediately
preceding Motion for Directed Verdict in its ruling, as UTCO
concedes on appeal "the trial court's failure to cite its basis
16

[i.e., Rule 12 or 41, or directed verdict] for declining to
instruct the jury on UTCO f s promissory estoppel claim is of no
moment as this Court pays no deference to the trial court!s legal
conclusions decided under any of these rules."
p. 11.

UTCO's Brief at

The trial court was correct, as a matter of law, in

declining to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory estoppel
claim and the judgment should be affirmed.
A.

UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS BARRED AS
THEY HAD AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW AVAILABLE AND
FAILED TO EXHAUST THESE LEGAL REMEDIES.

As a general rule, one must first exhaust his legal
remedies before he may recover on the basis of an equitable
claim.

Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App.

19 88);

Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d

773, 774 (Utah 1977)(exhaustion of remedies required before
pursuit of any equitable claim);

see also UTCO's Brief at p. 16

("it is true that where there is an adequate remedy at law, no
equitable remedy will be applied").

As the evidence shows, UTCO

had an adequate remedy at lav; and that remedy was its claim filed
in Mr. Zimmerman's pending bankruptcy.12
12

As a matter of law,

Despite the briefing and argument before the trial
court indicating that the legal remedy available to UTCO which
barred the promissory estoppel claim was UTCO's remedy in Mr.
Zimmerman's bankruptcy, UTCO ! s Brief argues that the trial court
mistakenly concluded that the available legal remedy was an
express contract between UTCO and Sumerset. That is simply
incorrect. The Motion and argument before the trial court,
including the argument of UTCOfs counsel, [R2411] clearly
demonstrate that it was not any express contract between UTCO and
Sumerset that the trial court held was the legal remedy available
to UTCO. Instead, it was the bankruptcy claim, as had been
briefed and fully argued to the trial court that served as the
17

UTCO's pending claim in Mr. Zimmerman's bankruptcy was a legal
remedy available to UTCO which barred them from pursuing the
equitable promissory estoppel claim against Sumerset and Mr.
Sharpe.

Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App.

1988).
This Court's decision in Knight is dispositive of this
issue.

In Knight, the plaintiff brought an equitable claim

against defendant for work plaintiff performed for a third-party
which benefitted defendant.

The plaintiff also had filed a claim

in the third-party's pending bankruptcy.

This Court, reversing

the lower court's judgment against defendant and in plaintiff's
favor, held as follows:
As a general rule, one must first
exhaust legal remedies before he may recover
on the basis of the equitable doctrine of
quantum meruit. [citations omitted] The
legal remedies available to fplaintiff]
included. . . pursuit of the [third-party's]
assets as a creditor in the rthird-party'si
bankruptcy proceeding, neither of which
[plaintiff] successfully exhausted.

[Plaintiff] raised his claim in the
corporation's bankruptcy proceeding, but at
the time he initiated his lawsuit, he
modified his claim to recover from the
corporation only the amount that he did not
recover from [defendant]. He did not pursue
his claim in bankruptcy to its end to attempt
to recover from corporate assets, but brought
this action during the pendency of the
bankruptcy action. Neither did he submit
evidence to the lower court that pursuit of
the bankruptcy claim would, in all

basis of its ruling.
18

likelihood, be fruitless. Thus, he did not
adequately pursue this remedy.
[Defendant] should not be held liable as
a consequence of [plaintiff's] failure to
successfully assert his legal rights.
Knight, 748 P.2d at 1099-1100 (emphases added).
That is the identical scenario present in this case.
The undisputed evidence establishes that UTCO filed claims
against Mr. Zimmerman in his bankruptcy to recover the same
$58,384 that is the subject of UTCO's promissory estoppel claim
against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.

[R2363-2364, 2445-2447]

UTCO's

claims were still pending against Mr. Zimmerman in the bankruptcy
proceeding,

[R2364] and UTCO presented no evidence its claims in

the bankruptcy would be fruitless.

In fact, the only evidence at

trial established that UTCO would receive a distribution under
the bankruptcy.

[R2447]

Additionally, UTCO had filed a

nondischargeability action in Mr. Zimmerman's bankruptcy which it
had not pursued to completion and which UTCO stopped pursuing
pending the outcome of the instant action.

[R2448-2449]

Thus,

UTCO had a legal remedy available which it had failed to exhaust
and, as this Court held in Knight, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe
"should not be held liable as a consequence of [UTCO's] failure
to assert its legal rights."

Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100.

Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to instruct the
jury on the equitable promissory estoppel claim as UTCO had
failed to exhaust its legal remedies and, therefore, could not
recover under that claim as a matter of law.

19

B.

THERE ! ARE SEVERAL OTHER BASES UPON WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT S DENIAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS PROPER AS A MATTER
OF LAW.

Even if Utah law were ignored and it was assumed that
somehow UTCOfs failure to pursue its claims in Mr. Zimmermanfs
bankruptcy did not bar its promissory estoppel claim in this
action, there are several independent legal bases upon which the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury was proper and should
be affirmed.13
1.

They are addressed in turn.
UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS BARRED AS
THERE WAS AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT BETWEEN UTCO AND
MR. ZIMMERMAN FOR REPAYMENT OF THE FUNDS AT ISSUE.

As a matter of law, the trial court also properly
refused to instruct on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim as UTCO
had a valid contract with Mr. Zimmerman for repayment of the very
funds it sought to recover under its promissory estoppel claim.
Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774
(Utah 1997).

This issue was also briefed in connection with the

Motion for Directed Verdict filed by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and
was argued to the Court.

On this issue, as with the failure to

exhaust legal remedies, Utah case law is determinative.

13

As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the trial court is
vested with discretion to properly advise the jury, which
discretion also includes refusing to give instructions when they
would be inappropriate. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc.,
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court has
stated: It is well recognized that the parties are entitled to
have their theories of the case presented to the jury in the form
of instructions, but only if they are supported by the evidence.
Id. (upholding trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
several theories).
20

In Commercial Fixtures, plaintiff sued defendant for
unjust enrichment seeking to recover for improvements plaintiff
made to defendant's premises pursuant to a contract with
defendant's lessee.

The lessee was not a party to the action.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of
the equitable remedy by stating:
It is also noted that there was an express contract
between plaintiff and the lessee for the furnishing of
materials, and when an express agreement exists one may
not be implied.
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774,
UTCO, as did the plaintiff in Commercial Fixtures, asked the
trial court to imply an agreement between itself and Sumerset or
Mr. Sharpe, even though the evidence conclusively established
that UTCO had an agreement with Mr. Zimmerman whereby Mr.
Zimmerman was already obligated to repay the very funds UTCO was
seeking to recover.

Thus, the trial court ! s refusal to instruct

on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim should be affirmed on this
additional ground.
2.

UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS PROPERLY NOT
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY
ESTABLISHED UTCO DID NOT RELY ON THE ALLEGED
PROMISES.

As a matter of law, the trial court also properly
refused to instruct on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim as there
was no basis upon which a jury could find that UTCO reasonably
relied upon the promise alleged to have been made by Sumerset.
This issue was also briefed in connection with the Motion for

21

Directed Verdict filed by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and was argued
to the Court.
To prevail on its promissory estoppel claim, UTCO must
establish that, inter alia, it reasonably relied upon the
purported promise.
1, 4 (Utah 1992);

E.g., Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 834 P.2d
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90.

The

evidence adduced at trial conclusively established that UTCO
failed to prove this element.
a.

No Reliance As UTCO's Decision To Loan And
The Loan Itself Was Made Before Alleged
Promise.

UTCO's promissory estoppel claim was based on
Sumerset ! s alleged misrepresentation

which, a.s described by Mr.

Nelson, UTCO's counsel and witness, 14 occurred in the course of
phone calls he had with Mr. Sharpe.

Mr. Nelson testified on

direct examination that during the conversation during which the
alleged promise was made, Mr, Nelson confirmed to Mr. Sharpe that
UTCO had made the $60,000 loan and Mr. Zimmerman had signed the
documents.
On cross-examination,

Mr. Nelson then confirmed twice

that his own deposition testimony accurately reflected the timing
of the conversation he had with Mr. Sharpe:
Q.

Just so I understand the timing of this
conversation, did this conversation occur before

14

Mr. Nelson was the only witness presented at trial with
any personal knowledge of the alleged promise. UTCO had conceded
that no one other than Mr. Nelson had any communications with
anyone from Sumerset regarding this transaction.
22

or after UTCO had made the decision to actually
loan funds to Mr. Zimmerman?
A.

After.

Q.

Did this conversation occur before or after the
conversation you had with Mr. Zimmerman in which
you informed him that UTCO would in fact loan him
$60,000?

A.

After.

Thus, the undisputed evidence established that UTCO ! s decision to
loan $60,000 to Mr. Zimmerman and the loan itself occurred before
the alleged promise.

Accordingly, as a matter of law, there was

no evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that UTCO
relied (reasonably or otherwise) on the alleged promise
underlying the promissory estoppel claim.

E.g. , Weese v. Davis

County Comm f n, 834 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1992)(promissory estoppel
requires showing of reasonable reliance).

UTCO had already

committed to make the loan, and had already made the loan when
the purported promise was made to Mr. Nelson.

Accordingly, as a

matter of law UTCO did not reasonably rely on the promise and the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory
estoppel claim must be affirmed.
b.

No Reliance As UTCO Had No Interest In The
Funds Wired To Sumerset.

As a matter of law, the trial court also properly
refused to instruct on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim as there
was no reliance as Mr. Zimmerman, not UTCO, owned the funds wired
to Sumerset.

The undisputed evidence, including UTCO's own

admission, established that UTCO had no ownership interest in the
23

funds that were wired to Sumerset.

Moreover, as discussed above,

UTCO agreed to make the loan and made the loan before the alleged
promise.

Accordingly, there simply was no detriment suffered by

UTCO as a result of any alleged promise and the promissory
estoppel claim failed as a matter of law.
3.

UTCO'S ARGUMENT ON THIS ISSUE IS INAPPLICABLE AS
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL CLAIM ON LEGAL GROUNDS AND THE CLAIM WAS
NEITHER SUBMITTED TO THE JURY NOR DECIDED BY THE
COURT.

The argument set forth in UTCOfs Brief in support of
its claim on appeal that the trial court did not properly
instruct the jury can be summarized as follows:

The parties

consented that the promissory estoppel claim would be tried to a
jury instead of the court even though it is an equitable claim
upon which a jury trial as a matter of right is not allowed.
UTCO then sets forth authority for the proposition that parties
can consent to a jury trial on equitable claims and if they do so
the trial court should not decide at the last minute that it, not
the jury, will be deciding the claim.

From this premise, UTCO

makes the nonsequitur argument that since the parties agreed that
the claim would be tried to a jury that it was error for the
trial court not to instruct them even though the claim was
insupportable as a matter of law.

That is not the law.

Under UTCOfs logic, once both parties to a case consent
to have a jury trial on an issue, the court could not refuse to
let that case go to the jury for any reason.

That would vitiate

summary judgments, motions to dismiss, and directed verdicts.
24

UTCO's position is simply wrong.

While it is true that a case

which proceeds through trial being tried to the jury should be
decided by the jury as opposed to the court, that rule of law
does not preclude a court from dismissing the claim if it is
legally improper despite the parties1 consent to a jury trial.
UTCO fails to cite a single case for the proposition that a court
cannot dismiss a claim as a matter of law even though the parties
consented to a jury trial.

To the contrary, courts routinely and

properly dismiss promissory estoppel (and other equitable claims)
when they are not supported by evidence or law under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

E.g., State Bank of Southern Utah v.

Troy Hygro Sys., Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1274-1275 (Utah App.
1995)(affirmed summary judgment on promissory estoppel claim
where claim failed as a matter of law); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d
764, 768-769 (Utah 1991)(affirmed motion to dismiss where
promissory estoppel claim failed as a matter of law); American
Towers Owners Ass!n, Inc. v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,
1192-1193 (Utah 1996)(affirmed summary judgment on equitable
claim where legal remedy available);

Commercial Fixtures and

Furnishing, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977)(same).
Accordingly, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
the promissory estoppel claim was proper as a matter of law and
the Judgment should be affirmed.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PRECLUDED EVIDENCE THAT THE
SERIAL NUMBER TENTATIVELY RESERVED FOR MR. ZIMMERMAN'S
HOUSEBOAT WAS REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER BOAT MORE THAN
THREE MONTHS AFTER THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION AND
AFTER MR. ZIMMERMAN CANCELED THE SALE,
Prior to trial, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed a Motion

in Limine seeking to exclude the introduction of the following
evidence:
(1)

That the serial number tentatively assigned to the
Zimmerman houseboat was reassigned more than three
months after the alleged misrepresentation, and
after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the sale and
instructed Sumerset to apply the funds to his
then-existing debt owed to Sumerset; and

(2)

That thereafter the second, different houseboat
was sold to a third-party.

The Motion in Limine sought exclusion of this evidence under
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
UTCO, in response to the Motion just as in its Brief on
appeal, was unable to articulate how this evidence concerning
conduct occurring three months after the transaction at issue was
relevant in any manner.

Instead UTCO simply repeats the general

proposition that the court, in a fraud case, is to consider all
facts and circumstances.
question.

That explanation simply begs the

For instance, under UTCOfs conclusory logic the trial

court would err in excluding evidence that Sumersetfs production
facility was painted a different color in March, 1993. While
equally irrelevant, it is a fact and circumstance that under
UTCO!s logic would have to be presented to the jury.

UTCO's

position notwithstanding, fraud allegations are subject to the
evidentiary requirements and limitations set forth in the Utah
26

Rules of Evidence as are all other claims.15

E.g., State v.

Winward/ 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995)(Evidence of
misconduct surrounding subsequent sale of property, sought to
show fraudulent intent, was properly precluded under the Utah
Rules of Evidence.)
UTCO's inability to articulate the relevance of
this evidence simply left the trial court without an explanation
as to how something which occurred more than three months after
the cancellation of the transaction at issue could have any
possible relevance.

After briefing and substantial argument to

the court, the trial court granted the Motion and explained:
I'm going to grant the motion. I can't see any
relevance to the proposition that the, at least based
on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a
serial number to another boat, to a third person who is
not claiming to be involved in this situation, has any
relevance to the state of mind of the Defendant for
purposes of committing fraud at the time these
representations were made. I recognize after events
may have some probative value, but in this case I can't
see what it might be.
The fact that the boat with a serial number did
not exist, and was never built to the specifications in
the original invoice, is all the Plaintiff needs in
that regard. The rest of it is surplusage and a waste

15

UTCO's true intention for introducing this evidence was
to create unfair prejudice and confusion. It is clear that UTCO
intended to use the evidence to attempt to create a question
regarding some perceived technical violation of the hull
identification statute and then have the jury base its decision
on this purported technical violation [R1519] instead of the
actual issue in this case —
namely, Sumerset's and Mr. Sharpe's
conduct toward UTCO which the jury ruled upon and found did not
support UTCO's claims. While Sumerset disputes any violation of
any law, it would be irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial and simply
confuse the jury even if it were deemed to have occurred. Thus,
the evidence was properly precluded.
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of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not coming
in. The Motion is granted.
That doesn't mean you can't put in evidence that
there was never a boat with that serial number, or that
was the serial number on the invoices and there is no
such boat, but it's not, I don't see any relevance to
the fact that serial number now appears on some other
boat. The Motion is granted.
[R1910]
In reviewing the trial court's evidentiary ruling,
deference is given to the trial court's advantageous position in
making this ruling and its decision will be affirmed unless "it
clearly appears that the lower court was in error."
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992);

E.g., Heslop

cf. Nay v.

General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993)("reverse
only if the ruling is beyond the bounds of rationality").
A.

THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 402
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS IT WAS PATENTLY
IRRELEVANT.

Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly
provides that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."

The trial court clearly acted within its discretion

when it precluded the introduction of this evidence on the
grounds it was irrelevant.
UTCO brought this action asserting claims for breach of
contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and other
miscellaneous claims arising out of the canceled sale of a
houseboat by Sumerset to Mr. Zimmerman.

UTCO's claim is centered

on a $60,000 loan it made to Mr. Zimmerman, a portion of which
was forwarded to Sumerset in December, 1992 to be applied to
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"Demarr Zimmerman Account."

A few months later, Mr. Zimmerman

canceled the purchase and directed Sumerset to apply the $58,384
to Mr. Zimmerman's then-existing debt owed to Sumerset.

Sumerset

then "sidetracked" the production of the houseboat Mr. Zimmerman
had ordered.
After Mr. Zimmerman canceled the purchase and the
houseboat at issue was sidetracked, and more than three months
after any alleged misrepresentation, Sumerset assigned the serial
number initially reserved for Mr. Zimmerman's houseboat to
another entirely different boat eventually sold to a third-party.
The assignment of the serial number to a different houseboat and
the sale of that boat to a third-party all occurred more than
three months after the transaction at issue in UTCO's claims and
that evidence is irrelevant to any of UTCO's claims. Therefore,
the evidence was properly precluded under Rule 402 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
At trial, UTCO was allowed to introduce all evidence
that had any potential relevance to its claims. UTCO introduced
the following evidence:
1)

The houseboat at issue was never constructed;
fE.g., R1910, 1928, 2097-2098]

2)

The houseboat at issue did not exist on the date
Sumerset received Mr. Zimmerman1s $58,384; [Id.]

3)

There was no houseboat constructed matching the
MSO and invoice created for Mr. Zimmerman's
houseboat; [Id.]

4)

The houseboat at issue never existed;
1929, 2097-2098]
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[R1910,

5)

The houseboat described in the November, 1992
invoice with the serial number in that invoice was
never manufactured by Sumerset; [R1910, 2097-2098]

6)

The houseboat with the serial number on the
Zimmerman invoice and MSO was sold to someone
else. [R2210]

All evidence potentially relevant to the issues in this case was
presented to the jury.

What happened to the houseboat's serial

number several months after the alleged misrepresentation and
several months after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the sale of the
houseboat is patently irrelevant;

thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in precluding its introduction.
B.

THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 403
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS ITS INTRODUCTION
WOULD HAVE CREATED CONFUSION OF THE ISSUES AND
UNFAIR PREJUDICE, AND WOULD HAVE BEEN A WASTE OF
TIME.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403.
As under Rule 402, it was within the trial court's discretion to
preclude this evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Even assuming there was some probative value to the
subsequent assignment of the serial number to another houseboat
months later, that probative value would have been substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the
30

issues, and would have unnecessarily lengthened the trial by
several days.

UTCO's apparent motivation in seeking to introduce

evidence of the subsequent reassignment of the serial number and
sale was to prejudice Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and introduce
confusion into the issues.

UTCO intended to use this evidence to

attempt to create some question that Sumerset subsequently
violated the law regarding assignment and affixing of hull
identification numbers to the Zimmerman houseboat or the second,
different houseboat.

[R1519]

Such a use of this irrelevant

evidence would directly violate Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, particularly where there is no evidence of any
alteration or changing of a serial number but merely a
reassignment on paper of a serial number to avoid a gap in serial
numbers.

While Sumerset (which has been in the houseboat

business for nearly 45 years) did not violate any laws in this
transaction, even assuming that more than three months after the
transaction at issue Sumerset somehow technically violated a
statute regarding the assigning of hull identification numbers,
the evidence would have been irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial,
and result in nothing but confusion.

The relevant issues for the

jury to determine were whether the acts of Sumerset and Mr.
Sharpe were fraudulent as to UTCO, not whether Sumerset later
broke the law or defrauded some third-party.

E.g., State v.

Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995).
If UTCO had been allowed to introduce evidence of the
reassigning of the serial number months later, Sumerset and Mr.
31

Sharpe would have been forced to counter that evidence
demonstrating why their subsequent actions were proper.

This

would have entailed several witnesses, substantial costs and
expenses, and would have consumed a number of trial days.
Additionally, it would have been unlikely that the jury would
have perceived that its verdict should not turn on whether the
subsequent reassignment of the serial number was proper,
especially after the bulk of the trial would have been focused on
this issue which is tangentially related, at best.

It is

precisely this type of confusing and prejudicial sidetrack that
Rule 403 was designed to prevent.

See McCormick, Evidence § 185;

State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995)(evidence
sought to prove fraudulent intent properly precluded under Rule
403 where the proffered evidence posed risk of diverting jury's
attention from pertinent issue and would prejudice defendant);
West v, Carson, 49 F.3d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1995).
Thus, based on the foregoing the trial court's ruling
excluding the evidence of the subsequent reassignment of the
serial number to a second, different houseboat that was
eventually sold was within the trial court's discretion and was
proper under the Utah Rules of Evidence.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court properly declined to instruct the jury
on UTCO's equitable promissory estoppel claim as UTCO failed to
exhaust its legal remedies, had a valid contract with Mr.
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Zimmerman for repayment of the funds, and, moreover, failed to
rely on the alleged promise.

The trial court also acted within

its discretion in precluding UTCO from introducing evidence of
the subsequent reassignment of the serial number tentatively
reserved for Mr. Zimmerman's houseboat to another boat three
months after the transaction at issue and after Mr. Zimmerman
canceled the purchase.

That ruling was proper under Rules 402

and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Accordingly, the Judgment

rendered in favor of Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe by the jury should
be affirmed and this appeal dismissed.
DATED this 29th day of December, 1997.
ATKIN & LILJA
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748 P.2d 1097, Knight v. Post, (Utah App. 1988)
*1097 748 P.2d 1097
Stan KNIGHT, dba Stanco Insulation Services,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
George P. POST, dba Post Petroleum Company,
Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 860120-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 22. 1988.
Company contracted with corporate operator of oil
well to improve oil well site.
When corporate
operator did not pay and filed bankruptcy, company
brought action against proprietorship which owned
working interest in oil well to recover for services
performed in improving oil well.
The Seventh
District Court, Uintah County, Richard C. Davidson,
J., found in favor of company on basis of quantum
meruit, and proprietorship appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J., held that restitution based on
quantum meruit was improper where company failed
to first exhaust legal remedies, company did not show
that proprietorship had been unjustly enriched, and
company had no contractual relationship, either
express or implied, with proprietorship.
Reversed.
1. APPEAL AND ERROR <£=>845(2)
30
-—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A)
Scope, Standards, and Extent, :r.
General
30k844
Review Dependent on Mode oi Trial
in Lower Court
30k845
In General
30k845(2)
Cases submitted below on agreed
case or statement.
Utah App. 1988.
Where parties have stipulated facts for purposes of
appeal, reviewing court does not apply clearly
erroneous standard but will sustain court's decision
only if convinced of its correctness.
2. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<®^30
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds oi Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk30
Work and labor in general; quantum
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meruit.
Utah App. 1988.
One must first exhaust legal remedies before he may
recover on basis of equitable doctrine of quantum
meruit.
3. MINES AND MINERALS <©=> 109
260
—
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260111(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident tc
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working.
Utah App. 1988.
Company which made improvements on oil well site
pursuant to contract between company and corporate
operator of well and which did not receive payment
for work could not seek recovery on basis of quantum
meruit since company did not first exhaust legal
remedies where company failed to bring action
enforcing mechanics' lien within statutory period,
company did not pursue claim in bankruptcy to its end
when corporate operator filed for bankruptcy, and
company did not submit evidence to lower court that
pursuit of bankruptcy claim would be fruitless.
4. BANKRUPTCY <®=»2397(1)
51
_
51IV
Effect of Bankruptcy Relief: Injunction
and Stay
51IV(B) Automatic Stay
5lk2394
Proceedings, Acts, or Persons
Affected
5lk2397
Mortgages or Liens
Slk2397(l)
In general.
[Sec headnote text below]
4. MECHANICS' LIENS <S=*260(4)
257
—
257X1 Enforcement
257k260 Time to Sue, Limitations, and Laches
257k260(4) Commencement of suit.
Utah App. 1988.
Corporation's bankruptcy action does not necessarily
preclude recovery under properly filed mechanics'
lien nor does it toll requirement of bringing action to
enforce such lien within statutory 12-month period.
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5, 38-1-11.
5. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<S=^30
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk30
Work and labor in general; quantum
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meruit.
Utah App. 1988.
Two branches of quantum meruit are contracts
implied in law, also known as quasi-contracts or
unjust enrichment, which are not actions to enforce
contract but are actually actions to require restitution,
and contracts implied in fact, which are contracts
established by conduct.
6. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<@^2.1
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(A) In General
205Hk2
Constructive or Quasi Contracts
205Hk2.1
In general.
Formerly 205Hk2
[See headnote text below]
6. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(A) In General
205Hk2
Constructive or Quasi Contracts
205Hk3
Unjust enrichment.
Utah App. 1988.
To prevail under theory of contract implied in law or
unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show that plaintiff
conferred benefit upon defendant, defendant was
aware of benefit, and defendant retained benefit under
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for him
to retain benefit without payment of its value.
7. MINES AND MINERALS <S^109
260
—
260IQ Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260111(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident to
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working.
Utah App. 1988.
Although
company
conferred
benefit
of
improvement of oil well site upon proprietorship
which owned working interest in oil well, company
did not show that proprietorship retained benefit under
circumstances that would make it inequitable for it to
retain benefit without payment of its value where
company introduced no evidence to indicate that
proprietorship requested services of company or
deliberately misled it.
8. MINES AND MINERALS <S^109
260
—
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260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260111(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident to
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working.
Utah App. 1988.
Company failed to show that there was either
express or implied contract between it and
proprietorship owning working interest in oil well on
which company made improvements for which it was
never paid where company did not know of
proprietorship's existence at time it entered into
contract with corporate operator of well and so could
not have had any direct dealings including express
contract with proprietorship.
9. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<@=*35
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk33
Rendition and Acceptance of Services
in General
205Hk35
Effect of request or promise to pay.
Utah App. 1988.
Required elements of recovery on theory of contract
implied in fact are that defendant requested plaintiff to
perform work, plaintiff expected defendant to
compensate him, and defendant knew or should have
known that plaintiff expected compensation.
10. MINES AND MINERALS <@=>109
260
—
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260111(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident to
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working.
Utah App. 1988.
Company did not have implied-in-fact contract with
proprietorship which owned working interest in oil
well on which company had made improvements
pursuant to contract with corporate operator of well
where company did not know of or deal with
proprietorship prior to bankruptcy proceedings of
corporate operator of well, proprietorship did not
request company to perform work or expect to pay
him because proprietorship did not deal with
company, and company could not have expected
proprietorship to pay it because it did *1097 not
know of proprietorship's existence.
*1098 F. Alan Fletcher (argued), Pruitt, Gushee &
Fletcher, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
John R. Anderson (argued), Vernal, for plaintiff and
respondent.
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Betore BILLINGS, GARFF and JACKSON. JJ.

in bankruptcy. On January 10, 1983, Knight filed a
creditor's claim against the corporation in the
bankruptcy proceedings, seeking payment of the entire
amount due. Subsequently, Knight learned that tne
corporation had no interest in the well location, but
was merely the operator of the well, and that George
Post had an ownerslup interest in the well.

OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
The trial court found defend ant/ appell ant, George P
Post, a part owner of an oil well, liable tor labor and
materials provided by pi ainti it/respondent, Stan
Knight, to improve the oil well site pursuant to a
contract between Knight and the corporate operator of
the well. Post seeks reversal ot the judgment.
The parties agreed to the toll owing statement ot the
record on appeal: Knight conducted an insulation
business known as Stanco Insulation Services. Post,
doing business under a proprietorship named Post
Petroleum Company, owned a 33.75% working
interest in an oil well located in Umtah County, Utah
Post Petroleum Company, Inc. (the corporation), was
the corporate operator ot the oil well.
The
corporation is not a party to this action and is a
separate entity from Post's proprietorship.
In March 1982, Knight orally contracted with the
corporation to furnish labor and materials tor
insulating an oil tank battery and erecting two
buildings at the well site
At rhis time, he was
unaware ot the existence of the proprietorship, Post
Petroleum Company, and did not know who ownea
the well. He satisfactorily completed the contracted
work between March 18, 1982 and April 26, 1982.
and then, according to instructions given by the
corporation's president. *1099
Larry McLane,
submitted his invoice for S 18,437.13 to the
corporation. There was no dispute that this was a
reasonable price for the work. Knight did not deal
with George Post personally during the course ot this
work, nor was he aware of any rclatioaship between
the corporation and Post Petroleum Company.
The corporation never paid Knight, and, in
course ot his several inquiries about the unpaid
with McLane, Knight was never advised that
should bill any other party. However, both Post
the corporation knew that Knight was billing
corporation and not the proprietorship.

the
bill
he
and
the

On July 14, 1982, Knight, unaware that the
corporation had no possessory interest in the oil well,
attempted to record a mechanics' lien on the oil well
property, but placed an incorrect property description
on his lien.

In March 1983, Post Petroleum Company, Post's
proprietorship, which had taken over operation ct the
well, contracted with Knight to do additional work on
the well tor which it paid him $395.60. Knight then
sought payment from Post on his $18,437.13 claim,
but was refused. Knight initiated this lawsuu, seeking
to recover the $18,437.13 claim, 18% interest, and
S2,500 in attorney tees trom Post. He then amended
nis still-pending bankruptcy claim, seeking only those
sums which he did not recover from Post.
The trial court found in favor of Knight on the basis
ot quantum meruit, reasoning that the relationship
between George Post and the corporation had unjustly
confused Knight as to the proper party from whom to
seek payment, and that Post was the ultimate
beneticiary ot the contract between Knight and the
corporation. However, the couit reduced tne amount
due Knight under the contract by the 66 25 "6 ot the
well owned by non-parties tc the lawsuit.
On appeal, Post argues that the trial court erred m
awarding judgment against him on the basis of
quantum meruit
We agree, reverse the trial court,
and find that restitution based on quantum meruit was
improper because: (1) Knight tailed to first exhaust
his legal remedies, (2) Knight did not introduce
sutticient evidence to show that Post had been uijustiy
enriched;
and (3) there was nc contractual
relationship, either express or implied, Dexween
Knight and Post.
[1] The Utah Supreme Court, m Sacramento
Baseball Club, Inc. v. The Great Northern Baseball
Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987)(citation
omitted), stated that "[w]hen a trial court relies on
stipulated facts to decide a case, this Court does not
apply the clearly erroneous standard, but will sustain
the lower court's decision only if convinced of its
correctness. Thus, we examine the facts de n o v o /
Although, in the present case, the parties have
stipulated facts for the purposes of appeal, we see no
distinction, and the standard of review remains the
same. Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P.2d 121, 123
(Utah 1983). Thus, we review both factual and legal
issues

Several months later, the corporation filed a petition
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I
Failure to Exhaust Legal Remedies
[2][3][4] As a general rule, one must first exhaust
his legal remedies before he may recover on the basis
of the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. See
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d
1382, 1388 (Utah 1982); Commercial Fixtures and
Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1977).
The legal remedies available to Knight
included a mechanics' lien on the well property and
pursuit of the corporation's assets as a creditor in the
corporation's bankruptcy proceeding, neither of which
Knight successfully exhausted.
*1100 Knight failed to perfect his mechanics' lien
against Post because he incorrectly described the
affected property, thus not complying with Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 38-1-7 (1981). See Westinghouse Hec.
Supply Co. v. W. Seed Prod. Corp., 119 Ariz. 377,
580 P.2d 1231, 1233 (App.1978); Buehner Block Co.
v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 520-21
(1957).
Further, Knight failed to bring an action enforcing
the lien within the statutory period. Under Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 38-1-11 (1974), (FN1) an action to enforce
a mechanics' lien must be commenced within twelve
months from the completion of the work. An
untimely action under this section is jurisdictional and
forecloses the parties' rights. (FN2) AAA Fencing
Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289,
290-91 (Utah 1986); Morrison v. Carey-Lombard
Co., 9 Utah 70, 33 P. 238, 239 (1893). Therefore,
Knight did not exhaust this remedy, and, at this point
in time, may not because his rights and remedies
under the mechanics' lien statutes are extinguished.
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
Knight raised his claim in the corporation's
bankruptcy proceeding, but at the rime he initiated this
lawsuit, he modified his claim to recover from the
corporation only the amount that he did not recover
from Post. He did not pursue his claim in bankruptcy
to its end to attempt to recover from corporate assets,
but brought this action during the pendency of the
bankruptcy action. Neither did he submit evidence to
the lower court that pursuit of the bankruptcy claim
would, in all likelihood, be fruitless. Thus, he did not
adequately pursue this remedy.
Post should not be held liable as a consequence of
Knight's failure to successfully assert his legal rights.
See Utschig v. McClone, 16 Wis.2d 506. 114

Page 4
N.W.2d 854 (1962). As in Commercial Fixtures,
Knight has failed to exhaust his legal remedies, so
may not recover on the basis of quantum meruit.
II
Quantum Meruit
Because the trial court based its ruling upon
quantum meruit, we address that question even though
our ruling on failure to exhaust legal remedies is
dispositive of the case.
[5] In Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah
Ct.App. 1987), this Court has identified two branches
of quantum meruit: (1) contracts implied in law, also
known as quasi-contracts or unjust enrichment, which
are not actions to enforce a contract but are actually
actions to require restitution;
and (2) contracts
implied in fact, which are contracts established by
conduct. Knight cannot prevail under either of these
branches.
[6] First, to prevail under the first branch of
quantum meruit, contracts implied in law or unjust
enrichment, Knight mast show the following three
elements: (1) Knight conferred a benefit upon Post:
(2) Post was aware of the benefit; and (3) Post
retained the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for him to retain the benefit
without payment of its value. Berrett v. Stevens, 690
P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984); Davies, 746 P.2d at 269.
[7] It is undisputed that Knight conferred a benefit
upon Post and that Post knew about and was using the
benefit. However, Knight did not show that Post
*1101. retained the benefit under circumstances that
would make it inequitable for him to retain it without
payment of its value. In Commercial Fixtures, the
Utah
Supreme
Court
defined
inequitable
circumstances as:
[t]he mere fact that a third person benefits from a
contract between two others does not make such
third person liable in quasi-contract, unjust
enrichment, or restitution. There must be some
misleading act, request for services, or the like, to
support such an action.
Mere failure of
performance by one of the contracting parties does
not give rise to a right of restitution.
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
Knight relies upon the reasoning in Paschall's, Inc.
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v. Dozier, 219 Term. 45, 407 S.W.2d 150 (1966),
which states that recovery on a quantum meruit action
may be had in some instances in winch a materialman
or subcontractor furnishes labor or materials which
benetit the property of a person with whom there is
not privity of contract. However, this is at variance
with Commercial Fixtures.
Knight introduced no evidence to indicate that Post
requested services ot Knight or deliberately misled
him In tact, the parties stipulated that Knight did not
even know of Post's existence until after the
corporation had filed for bankruptcy.
The only
evidence introduced even suggesting a misleading act
is the similarity in names between the corporation and
the proprietorship. While we recognize the possibility
that Post created a corporation and a proprietorship
with the same name to deliberately detraud creditors,
it and when the corporation went bankrupt, Knight
has not introduced any such evidence. There tore, he
has not shown that it would be inequitable tor Post to
retain the benefit without payment ot its value.
[8] Second, Knight has failed to show that there is
either an express or implied contract between himstlr
and Post, on which he may base recovery.
See
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774
The stipulated facts indicate that Knight did not
know ot Post's existence at the time he entered into
the contract, so could not have had any dnect
dealings, including an express contract, with Post.
[9][10] Also, Knight did not prove the required
elements of the second branch ot quantum meruit.
contracts implied in fact, to show the existence of an
implied contract with Post
To prevail under this
theory, Knight was required to show that (1) Post
requested Knight to perform the work, (2) Knight
expected Post to compensate him; and (3) Post knew
or should have known that Knight expected
compensation. Davies, 746 P.2d at 269.
The facts indicate that Knight did not know of or

deal with Post prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, so
Post did not request Knight to perform the work or
expect to pay him because he did not deal with
Knight, and Knight could not have expected Post to
pay him becaase he did not know of Post's existence
On the contrary, Knight had an express contract
with the corporation, and dealt exclusively with it in
contracting to do the work, attempting to collect his
bill, and filing his mechanics' lien. Thus, Knight did
not have an implied contract with Post.
See
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
Since there was no express or implied contract with
Post, Knight cannot recover.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed
awarded to Post.

Costs

BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
FN1. This statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must
be begun within twelve months alter the complexion
ot the original contract.... Within the twelve months
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for
record with the county recorder of each county in
which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency
of the action, in the manner provided m actions
affecting the title or right to possession of real
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to
persons who have been made parties to the action
and persons having actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action
FN2. We note that the corporation's bankruptcy
action did not necessarily preclude recovery under a
properly filed mechanics' lien nor did it toll the
requirement of bringing an action to enforce such a
hen within the statutory twelve month period. See
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 38-1-5 (1974); Munson v
Risinger, 114 So.2d 59, 61 (La.Ct.App. 1959).
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564 P.2d 773, Commercial Fixtures <& Furnishings. Inc. v. Adams, (Utah 1977)
•773 564P.2d773
COMMERCIAL FIXTURES AND
FURNISHINGS, I N C , a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Eldon ADAMS, an Individual, and New Life
Health Spa, by and
through Eldon Adams, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 14700.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 13, 1977.
A supplier of materials incorporated into leased
property at the request of the tenant brought an action
against the landlord after default under the lease had
occurred, seeking recovery for the value of the
materials under a theory of unjust enrichment. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County. George E. Ballif.
J., entered summary judgment for the landlord, and
the supplier appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J..
held that no basis for recovery was shown.
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contracting parties does not give rise to right of
restitution.
3. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<®^31
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk31
Materials furnished.
Formerly 412k3 WORK AND LABOR
Utah 1977.
Where tenant, who had agreed in lease to complete
such improvements in and upon leased property as its
business needs might require and to pay and discharge
all costs and expenses incident thereto to the end that
no liens would be placed on leased property,
contracted with supplier for certain materials, which
were incorporated into leased premises, and then
defaulted under lease, landlord was not liable to
supplier for value of such incorporated materials on
theory oi unjust enrichment.
Jack Fairclough, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.

Affirmed.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion in which
Crockett, J., concurred.

V. Pershing Nelson, Provo, for defendants and
respondents.
HALL, Justice:

1. MECHANICS' LIENS <£=>63
257 —257II Right to Lien
25711(C) Agreement or Consent of Owner
257k60
Necessity for Contract or Consent by
Owner
257k63
Improvements by lessee.
Utah 1977.
As general rule, tenant's creditors have no greater
right to charge land with value of improvements .or
repairs than tenant would have.
2. CONTRACTS <@=> 188
95
—
95II
Construction and Operation
9511(B) Parties
95kl88
Duties and liabilities of third persoas.
Utah 1977.
Mere fact that third person benefits from contract
between two others does not make such third person
liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or
restitution;
there must be some misleading act,
request for services, or the like, to support such
action, and mere failure of performance by one of the

This is an appeal from a summary judgment of no
cause of action rendered by the district court.
Defendant, Eldon Adams, is the owner of real
property located at 1140 South State Street, Orem,
Utah. He entered into a written lease with Great
Outdoors, Inc. under the terms of which the lessee
agreed to complete such improvements in and upon
said property as its business needs might require and
to pay and discharge all costs and expenses incident
thereto to the end that no liens would be placed on the
leased property.
Great Outdoors, Inc. thereafter
contracted with plaintiff for the purchase of materials
which were ultimately furnished and incorporated into
the building on the leased premises. The appellant
was not privy to that agreement. Great Outdoors
subsequently defaulted in the performance of the
covenants of said lease and by court judgment the
lease was terminated and the property restored to
defendant. Plaintiff filed no lien against the lessee's
interest in the property and the time limited for filing
has expired.
Plaintiff has never instituted suit against the lessee
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and brought this action directly against the defendant
on a theory of unjust enrichment.
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Judgment affirmed. Costs to defendant.
ELLETT, C.J., and WILKINS, J., concur.

The foregoing recitation of facts are those stipulated
to by the parties at the time they presented their
respective motions for summary judgment to the trial
court.
*774 [1] This appeal may be disposed of by the
application of some very elementary principles of law.
As a general rule, a tenant's creditors have no greater
right to charge the land with the value of
improvements or repairs than the tenant would have
(FN1) and here the tenant had no such right having
contracted it away.
The right of plaintiff to recover for the goods
incorporated into defendant's real property must be
based upon an agreement, either express or implied,
and the stipulated facts are clear that none existed.
Plaintiff placed no reliance at all on the credit of
defendant and the lease agreement specifically
imposed upon the lessee the sole obligation of
payment. A case in point is Howard v. Societa Di
Unione E Beneficenza Italiana, et al.. 62 Cal.App.2d
842, 145 P.2d 694.
[2] The mere fact that a third person benefits from a
contract between two others does not make such third
person liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or
restitution. See 66 Am.Jur.2d 960. There must be
some misleading act, request for services, or the like,
to support such an action.
Mere failure of
performance by one of the contracting parties does not
give rise to a right of restitution.
It is also noted that there was an express contract
between plaintiff and the lessee for the furnishing of
materials, and when an express agreement exists one
may not be implied. (FN2)
[3] The action brought by plaintiff is one in equity
and brought without any attempt to exhaust any legal
remedies available. Also, the stipulated facts are that
plaintiff has brought no suit against the lessee nor did
he initiate any action to enforce a mechanic's lien, if
any he had. As a consequence, such lien right was
lost by passage of time. Nor has plaintiff shown any
legal and sufficient excuse for his inaction agaiast the
lessee.
The authorities cited by plaintiff are distinguishable
on the facts presented here and do not compel support
of its position.
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MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting):
Defendant is the owner of property located in Or em,
Utah.
In March 1974, the defendant leased the
property to Great Outdoors, Inc. (hereinafter, lessee).
Under the terms of the lease, Great Outdoors agreed
to make improvements in the property and to operate
a health spa business thereon.
Lessee contracted with the plaintiff to install certain
fixtures. Plaintiff performed the contract at a cost of
53,149.87. Lessee did not pay the plaintiff, and
subsequently defaulted on the lease. Defendant lessor
brought a successful action to regain possession of the
property.
After taking possession, the defendant
continued to operate a health spa business on the
premises under the name New Life Health Spa.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover costs for
materials and labor furnished.
On simultaneous
motions for summary judgment, the lower court held
for the defendant finding the plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. This Court
should reverse.
The theory of plaintiff's case is that the defendant
has been unjustly enriched at plaintiff's expense and
should, therefore, make restitution to the plaintiff.
The lower court found the plaintiff was precluded
from maintaining this action, because there was no
privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant.
This finding mistakes the nature of a claim based on
unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is premised on
a theory of quasi-contract, or a contract implied in
law.
A contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but
an obligation imposed by *775 law for the purpose
of bringing about justice and equity without
reference to the intent or the agreement of the
parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement
between the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated
procedurally as if it were a contract . . . . (Emphasis
in original.) (FN1)
The plaintiff's cause of action does not fail for lack
of privity.
Defendant referred to several cases he claims
support the lower court's judgment. These cases are
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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distinguishable and do not support defendant's
assertioas.
For example, defendant claims, as a
general rule, a tenant's creditors have no greater right
to charge the value of the landlord's land with (the
costs of improvements) than the tenant could have. In
support of this position defendant relies on, among
others, American Bonding Co. v. Pueblo Investment
Co., 10 Cir., 150 F. 17 (1906) and Grizzle v.
Runbeck, 74 Riz. 92, 244 P.2d 1160 (1952).
American Bonding involved a suit by a tenant's
creditor against the tenant's surety. The case turned
on whether the tenant had agreed, by the terms of the
lease, to pay for improvements and whether the surety
had, by incorporating the lease into the bonding
agreement, agreed to pay for the improvements upon
tenant's default. In the context of interpreting the
terms of the lease, the court stated a lessee may not
make repairs at the expense of the lessor unless there
is an express agreement between them to do so. 150
F. at 28. There is no question in this case that the
tenant agreed to pay for the material and labor
furnished, both parties agree that he did.
The
question here is whether, as between plaintiff and
defendant, defendant has been unjustly enriched: not
whether the tenant defaulted on his obligation. The
Grizzle case is also distinguishable. In that case,
tenants brought suit against the landlord for the costs
of repairs. The case turned on whether the landlord
was under a duty to repair and the court held that
without an agreement to the contrary the landlord was
under no such duty. The question of the landlord's
duty to the tenant is not involved here.
Defendant also relies on Howard v. Societa Di
Unione E Beneficenza Italiana, 62 Ca!.App.2d 842,
145 P.2d 694 (1944). In that case the lessor (Society)
entered into an agreement with lessee for the rental of
a baseball field. The lessee agreed to be responsible
for the costs of repairs and improvements and then
failed to pay for plaintiff's services. Plaintiff brought
suit against the lessor claiming that lessor and lessee
were joint venturers and therefore, the lessor was
liable on lessee's debt based on a partnership theory.
The court found no evidence of partnership or joint
venture. The language quoted by defendant from that
case is not only dicta, it was made in the context of
determining the question of the existence of a
partnership, and related to a finding of an implied in
fact contract, not unjust enrichment.
Addressing himself directly to plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim, defendant argues that plaintiff's
claim is barred because the enrichment of defendant
was not unjust. Defendant cites a number of cases in
support of this proposition, including Buell v. Orion
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State Bank, 327 Mich. 43, 41 N.W.2d 472 (1950);
Uischig v. McClone, 16 Wis.2d 506, 114 N.W.2d
854 (1962). The Buell case involved a transfer of
stock that at the time of the transfer was of
questionable value. The stock later became worth a
great deal of money. Plaintiff brought suit claiming
that when her husband transferred the stock he was
not competent and that defendant had been unjustly
enriched by the transfer. The court held the decedent
was competent to make the transfer and although the
defendant was enriched, he had taken coasiderable
risk in accepting the *776 stock and his enrichment
was not unjust. The services of plaintiff, here, were
not of questionable value and defendant took no risk
in accepting them. The Utschig case involved a suit
by a subcontractor against a homeowner for the value
of labor and materials furnished. The court held that
a subcontractor could not maintain an action against
the homeowner unless there was an express agreement
between the two that the homeowner would be
respoasible for the debts of the principal contractor.
The court stated that the homeowner was not liable on
an implied contract simply because he had received
services or goods. The court was not clear whether it
was talking about an implied in fact contract or one
implied in law. However, the case would not seem
applicable here. The rules preventing a subcontractor
from seeking payment directly from homeowners are
based on the assumption that the homeowner has
already paid the principal contractor and cannot be
held liable twice on the same debt. That is not the
case here. The other cases cited by defendant are
similarly unpersuasive.
The question, then, remaias has the defendant beer,
enriched and is enrichment unjust. As was stated in
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337
(1947):
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has
and retains money or benefits which in justice and
equity belong to another. . . . The benefit may be
an interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in
action; beneficial services conferred; satisfaction of
a debt or duty owed by him; or anything which adds
to his security or advantage.
On the facts of the Baugh case, the court held
against the plaintiff. The case is, however, clearly
distinguishable from the facts at hand and the general
definition given of unjust enrichment is applicable to
the case at bar. See also, Fleming v. Wineberg, 253
Or. 472, 455 P.2d 600 (1969). It would seem clear
the defendant has been enriched. Improvements were
made to his property that made it possible for him to
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run a health spa business on the premises. In the
lease the defendant required that these improvements
be made. Presumably, the defendant would not have
required these improvements if he did not expect to
benefit from them.
Defendant did in fact regain possession of the
property and is running a business with the aid of
improvements that, without the lease, he would have
had to pay for himself. In other words, defendant has
obtained the benefit of plaintiff's services without
having to pay for them. The case of Paschall's, Inc.
v. Dozier, supra, is directly in point. In that case the
daughter of the defendant contracted with the plaintiff
to remodel a bathroom in defendant's house. The
daughter was living with the defendant at the time.
Plaintiff performed the services, but the daughter was
unable to pay.
Plaintiff sued the defendant
homeowner on a theory of unjust enrichment. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to restitution.
The court stated:
The defendant asserts that an implied undertaking
cannot arise against one benefited by the work
performed, where the work is done under a special
contract with another.
While this may be the
general rule, we do not think that it is applicable in
every case. Indisputably, where one is afforded
recovery from the person with whom he has a
contract, he cannot also recover from third persoas
incidentally benefited by his performance. . . .
However, the situation is dissimilar where a person
furnishes material and labor under a contract for the
benefit of a third party and that contract becomes
unenforceable or invalid. In that situation there is
certainly no reason to preclude the furnisher . . .
from seeking recovery agaiast the third person on
the theory of (unjust enrichment). 407 S.W.2d at
154--155. (FN2)
While it is true, as defendant notes, that in these
cases the defaulting party and the *777. defendant
had some special relationship
(father/daughter,
mother/son, etc.) the basic reasoning of the cases
applies to the facts at hand. In the case at bar,
plaintiff entered into a contract with a defaulting
party. That contract was at least in part for the
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benefit of a third party-the defendant. The contract
has become unenforceable, the defendant is enjoying
the benefits of the contract without paying for them.
The question to be answered in an unjust enrichment
is, do justice and equity require that the defendant be
forced to make restitution. Under the facts of this
case, they do so require.
The plaintiff is not precluded by the Uniform
Commercial Code from pursuing the remedy of
restitution. Section 70A--1--103, U.C.A., provides
that the principles of law and equity supplement the
Code and are not usurped by it.
From the foregoing it can be seen that summary
judgment was not proper. This being an action in
equity, a wider exploration of the facts is called for. I
would reverse and remand for an evidentiary
determination of the central question, 'Why should
plaintiff not recover.'
CROCKETT, J., concurs in Justice MAUGHAN'S
dissent.
FNl.
49 Am.Jur.2d
authorities.

702, Section 765, citing

FN2. 66 Am.Jur.2d 948, Section 6, citing Verdi v.
Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 196 P. 225, 15
A.L.R. 641.
F N l . Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler,
95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2c 1201, 1205 (1974). As
stated in Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Term. 45,
407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (1966): 'It is well established
that want of privity between parties is no obstacle to
recovery under quasi-contract.' See also: Fowler v.
Taylor, Utah, 554 P.2d 205 (1976); Rapp v. Salt
Lake City, Utah, 527 P.2d 651 (1974); Trollope v.
Koerner, 106 Ariz. 210, 470 P.2d 91 (1970).
FN2.
See also, De Gasperi v. Valicent, 198
Pa.Super. 455, 181 A.2d 862 (1962); Karon v.
Kellogg, 195 Minn. 134, 261 N.W. 861 (1935);
Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146
S.E.2d 434 (1966).
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